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ABSTRACT 
Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the 
Competition Policy Indexes * 
by Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo, and 
Cristiana Vitale 
The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators 
of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The 
CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, 
where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the 
merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on 
how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark 
of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow cross-
country and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a 
sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005. 
 
 
Keywords:  Competition Policy, Indicator, Deterrence, Competition Law 
JEL Classification:  K21, K42, L40 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the 
Competition Policy Indexes 
Ziel dieses Beitrag ist die umfassende Beschreibung von neu entwickelten 
Indikatoren über die Qualität von wettbewerbspolitischen Systemen: die so 
genannten „Competition Policy Indexes“ (CPIs). Die CPIs messen die 
Abschreckungsmerkmale der Wettbewerbspolitik in einem Staat oder, genauer 
gesagt, in einer Gebietskörperschaft. Unter Wettbewerbspolitik ist hierbei 
sowohl das Kartellrecht als auch seine Vollstreckung definiert, wobei auch die 
Fusionskontrolle einbezogen ist. Die CPIs bauen auf „harten“ Daten über die 
zentralen Merkmale eines wettbewerbspolitischen Regimes auf. Diese werden 
mit Orientierungswerten verglichen, welche anhand von in der Literatur und 
Praxis allgemein bewährten Verfahren definiert sind. Schließlich werden sie in 
Indikatoren zusammengefasst, welche einen internationalen Vergleich über die 
Zeit erlauben. Diese Indikatoren wurden für eine Stichprobe von 13 OECD 
Gebietskörperschaften (12 OECD Länder und die Europäische Union) für die 
Zeitspanne 1995-2005 berechnet. 
 2
1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to introduce the Competition Policy Indexes, from hereon “CPIs”, a novel 
set of indicators of the quality/intensity of competition policy.1 The CPIs measure the deterrence 
effect of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust 
legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement.2 The CPIs incorporate 
data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of 
generally-agreed best practices and summarise them, so as to allow cross-country and cross-time 
comparisons.  
 
The CPIs are based on a bottom-up approach, in which each jurisdiction’s scores can be related to 
specific features of its competition policy. Applying a consolidated methodology, developed by the 
OECD for the indicators of product market regulations (PMR) and the competition law and policy 
indexes (CPL), the CPIs have a pyramidal structure which encompasses a large number of sub-
indicators that are progressively aggregated using a set of weights at each level of aggregation.34 
We first used a weighting scheme in which the weights were assigned according to the relevance 
that each item in our view deserves. Subsequently we adopted an alternative scheme, which 
aggregates the different features of a competition policy regime using factor analysis, as a 
robustness check. 
 
As mentioned above, the methodology herein proposed for building the CPIs is akin to the one used 
by the OECD for building the PMR indicators and the CPL indexes. However, the former aim at 
measuring restrictions to competition due to inappropriate regulations (e.g. on entry or business 
activities) and the latter consider both policies that enhance the general level of competition (i.e. ex-
post policies implemented by the Competition Authorities, from hereon CAs) and policies that 
encourage and promote competition in deregulated network industries (i.e. ex-ante policies 
implemented by sector regulators), whereas the CPIs focus only on the policies that enhance the 
general level of competition. In addition, while the PMR indicators have been calculated only for 
two years (1998 and 2003) and the CPL indexes only for one year (2003), the CPIs have both a 
                                                 
1 The CPIs have been used in the recent paper by Buccirossi et. al. (2009a) to estimate the effects of competition policy 
on the growth of total factor productivity. 
2 A jurisdiction is the territory within which the power to interpret and apply a specific legislation can be exercised. It 
does not always coincide with the boundaries of a nation (e.g. the European Union).  
3 See Høj, J. (2007). 
4 See Boylaud O. G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta (2000); Conway, P. V. Janod and G. Nicoletti (2005); Conway, P. and G. 
Nicoletti (2006).  
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cross-country and a cross-time dimension, as we calculated them for 13 OECD jurisdictions over a 
period of ten years (1995-2005).56  
 
The next section discusses the features of a competition policy regime that we have included in the 
CPIs on the grounds that we believe these are the ones that affect its effectiveness. Section 3 
explains how the CPIs are structured, while sections 4, 5 and 6 explain in more detail the steps 
followed in their construction. Section 7 describes the data we have used to calculate the CPIs over 
our sample. Section 8 explains how we derived the weighting schemes based on factor analysis. 
Section 9 illustrates how well competition policy works in the jurisdictions in our sample by 
examining the pattern of some of the CPIs over the relevant period. Section 10 compares the CPIs 
with other indicators of a similar kind that have been developed by other economists. The last 
section contains some concluding remarks. 
2 What makes competition policy work? 
In this paper the term competition policy refers to the competition legislation (including the merger 
control provisions) and its enforcement. All other forms of competition-enhancing policies, such as 
the reduction of “red tape” that favours the entry of new firms, consumer protection, competition 
advocacy, state aid controls or ex-ante sectoral regulation, are not included in our definition of 
competition policy. Hence, for the purpose of this paper a competition policy includes a set of 
prohibitions and obligations that firms have to comply with to ensure that competition is not 
reduced or altered, together with an array of tools for policing and punishing any violation. We will 
generically refer to these as the features of a competition policy regime. 
 
Many economists share the view that the ultimate aim of competition policy should be to maximise 
social welfare, where social welfare is given by the un-weighted sum of the profits of all the firms 
and of aggregate consumer surplus.78 Other alternatives have been proposed, where a lower weight 
is given to the welfare of the firms with respect to that of the consumers, or where the welfare of 
society is identified only with that of the consumers.9 The objective function of the European 
                                                 
5 The time period has been chosen on the basis that it was difficult to obtain reliable information too far behind in the 
past and also so as not to excessively burden the CAs who had accepted to help us in colleting the information.  
6  The 13 jurisdictions included in our sample are: Canada, Czech Republic, European Union, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, US. Originally we had planned to include also Greece and 
Australia but we did not manage to obtain any reply to our questionnaire from their CAs.  
7 See Buccirossi (2007) and Motta (2004) for a general discussion of the objective of competition policy. 
8 See Kaplow and Shavell (2002). 
9 See Neven and Röller (2005), who considers the political economy environment that an antitrust agency is operating 
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Commission, as well as those of many national CAs, incorporates a definition of social welfare that 
includes only the consumers’ surplus.  
 
We are not going to discuss here what should be the “right” definition of social welfare that a 
competition policy should protect and enhance, and we shall take as given the way in which each 
jurisdiction has designed, and each CA has implemented, its competition policy over the years 
considered in our sample. 
 
Given the above definition, it becomes clear that the role of a CA consists of using the powers and 
the resources conferred on it by the law to ensure that firms operating within its jurisdiction 
undertake the least possible number of behaviours that reduce social welfare by impairing 
competition. This implies that the aim of a CA consists of deterring anticompetitive behaviours.10  
 
It follows that the most effective competition policy regime is one in which the CA achieves total 
deterrence and, hence, never has to block a merger, never has to uncover a cartel or any other 
anticompetitive agreement, and never has to condemn a firm for abusing its dominant position.11 In 
an ideal regime firms do not dare to propose an anticompetitive merger, do not attempt to form a 
cartel, never enter into an anticompetitive agreement and do not even consider using their market 
power with the aim of excluding rivals and reducing social welfare. In addition, in the ideal 
competition policy regime, firms never refrain from attempting a merger, concluding a contract or 
undertaking a unilateral conduct, if these actions improve social welfare.  
 
In this paper we evaluate a competition policy regime on the basis of its ability to deter all those 
                                                                                                                                 
in and considers how this impacts on the choice of the appropriate welfare standard in merger control. The authors show 
that, when the antitrust agency can be influenced by third parties and it is imperfectly monitored, neither a consumer 
surplus standard nor a welfare standard dominates, whereas, when lobbying is efficient, when accountability is low, 
where mergers are large and when a marginal increase in merger size is highly profitable, a consumer surplus standard 
is more attractive. The authors do not discuss whether their analysis can or should be extended to other competition law 
infringements. See Salop (2005). 
10 In order to avoid confusion we want to stress that the form of deterrence we refer to here is the one generally called 
ex-ante, or general, deterrence, which consists of preventing agents from undertaking illegal behaviours by threatening 
violators with sufficiently heavy and prompt sanctions. There is also a second form of deterrence, called specific 
deterrence or desistance, which takes place ex-post (i.e. after an unlawful behaviour had already taken place and was 
discovered or when an anticompetitive merger is blocked) and works through a corrective change in behaviour induced 
in the economic agents prosecuted and convicted for the detected violation (or whose merger was stopped). Specific 
deterrence is less important, as general deterrence should prevent all socially harmful practices, but it still plays a role 
for those complex behaviours where mistakes in the forecast of their effects on social welfare are likely. 
11 There is no reason to believe that the ideal competition policy regime is the one that a jurisdiction should strive for. 
Indeed the ideal regime, even if it were feasible, would entail very high implementation costs, and these are probably 
much higher than the ones society would be rationally willing to bear: the ideal competition policy regime may not be 
the most efficient one. 
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market conducts that harm social welfare. 12  To do so we have identified those features of a 
competition policy regime that we believe have the strongest impact on the level of deterrence it can 
engender. We based our choice of these features on the economic theory of the public enforcement 
of law. This theory originates from Becker's seminal paper, which shows that entry into illegal 
activities can be explained by the same model of choice that economists use to explain entry into 
legal activities, and which applies the economic approach to incentive design to address the legal 
problem of deterring unlawful behaviours.13 This theory claims that the level of deterrence depends 
on: 1) the level of the punishment wrongdoers can expect to suffer if they are convicted relative to 
their expected gain from the violation, 2) the perceived probability of being caught and convicted, 
and 3) the perceived probability of errors in the investigation and evaluation of the violations.14 
 
Since Becker’s contribution, competition law enforcement has become a specific research subject, 
which has gone well beyond extending, or adapting, results in the economic theory of the public 
enforcement of law. Building on all this literature, we have identified the policy 
variables/dimensions that are most likely to affect the three key determinants of deterrence when the 
relevant law is the competition legislation, and, thus, make the policy more or less effective.15 With 
regard to violation of antitrust rules these are: the degree of independence of the CA with respect to 
political or economic interests; the separation between adjudicator and prosecutor; the quality of the 
law on the books (i.e. how close are the rules that make the partition between legal and illegal 
conducts to their effect on social welfare); the scope of investigative powers the CA holds; the level 
of the financial loss (i.e. the overall sanction) that firms and their employees can expect to suffer as 
a consequence of a conviction; the level of activity of a CA, and the amount and the quality of the 
financial and human resources the CA can rely on when performing its tasks.16 17 In the case of 
                                                 
12 The reason why our indicators measure the deterrence effect, rather than the quality of a competition policy regime, is 
because the latter increases with the level of deterrence up to the point when this becomes over-deterrence. However, it 
is very hard to say when the level of deterrence engendered by a competition policy regime has reached the point when 
it also starts to inhibit efficient behaviours. Hence, we consider it more appropriate to limit our analysis to the level of 
deterrence. 
13 Becker G. (1968). 
14 These errors weaken the level of deterrence a given sanction can induce. An enforcement agency can commit an error 
when it convicts someone who has not violated the law (normally referred to as a type I error) or when it acquits 
someone who is effectively guilty (normally referred to as a type II error). The probability that someone may be held 
liable even when she is adopting a legal behaviour reduces the rewards that are obtained from respecting the law, thus 
increasing the net gain from a breach of the law; similarly the probability of being acquitted although one is violating 
the law renders the probability of being investigated and convicted lower, reducing the expected sanction. Hence, both 
types of errors make the alternative of violating the law more attractive. See Polinsky and Shavell, (2000), Buccirossi et 
al. (2006c), and Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006). 
15 See also Buccirossi et al. (2009b). 
16 There are of course other determinants of deterrence that do not fall among the categories discussed above. For 
example, when a cartel is international in scope and leniency policies are not coordinated across countries and agencies, 
the risk for the first whistleblower in a country to be the second one (hence, obtaining reduced or no leniency) in other 
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merger control the features selected are slightly different, because investigative powers are not very 
relevant in merger cases (as these are ex-ante investigations which do not involve infringement of 
legal obligations, but rather a request for approval for a business operation) and there are no 
sanctions for potentially anticompetitive mergers18.  
3 The structure of the Competition Policy Indexes 
Each indicator has been obtained from the linear aggregation of data on the competition policy 
variables discussed above. 19 This aggregation followed a series of steps, which are discussed below 
and summarised in Table 1.  
 
1. Each piece of information on each policy feature was assigned a score on a scale of 0-1 
against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practice (from worst to best). In order to 
assign scores we determined what could be considered as best practice by relying on 
scientific papers and books, on documents prepared by international organisations such 
as the International Competition Network and the OECD, and on our judgement. These 
references are cited below, when we discuss in more detail how each feature has been 
scored, and are summarised in two tables included in Appendix A.  
 
2. All the information on a specific policy feature was summarised in a separate low level 
index using a set of weights to aggregate it.  
 
3. The low-level indexes were aggregated into two medium-level indexes for each of three 
types of possible competition law infringements and for mergers, one which summarises 
the institutional features of the competition policy and one which summarises the 
enforcement features. 
 
4. The medium-level indexes were then aggregated to form a number of different summary 
                                                                                                                                 
countries because cartel partners reacted to your reporting the cartel by rushing to self-report elsewhere may clearly 
hinder the deterrence effects of leniency programs. However, in this study we are focusing on cross-country differences, 
hence this kind of issues, though interesting, fall outside the scope of our analysis. 
17 The expected sanctions depend on both the types and the levels of the sanctions that can be imposed and the types 
and the levels of the sanctions that are actually imposed. 
18 In the case of mergers, there are only sanctions for procedural violations. 
19 We are aware that there might be complementarities among different aspects of competition policy that we may miss 
by using this linearly additive specification. However, we believe that it would be difficult to choose a more precise 
approximation of the relationship that could exist between these variables, hence we have decided to select this 
aggregation form that has the advantage of being simple and at the same time rather complete. 
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indexes, which we generically refer to as the CPIs. More specifically we have calculated 
(for each jurisdiction and each year in the sample): 
 
- one index that measures the deterrence effect of the competition policy with regard 
to all antitrust infringements (the Antitrust CPI) and one that measures its deterrence 
effect in the merger control process (the Mergers CPI).  
- one index that assesses the deterrence effect of the institutional features (the 
Institutional CPI) and one that assesses the deterrence effect of the enforcement 
features (the Enforcement CPI).  
- a single index that incorporates all the information on the overall deterrence effect of 
the competition policy regime in a jurisdiction (the Aggregate CPI). 
4  The construction and composition of the low-level indexes 
The first two steps in the construction of the CPIs consisted of calculating the low-level indexes. 
Each of these indexes includes information on one of the sets of policy variables discussed above 
(in section 2.1), which we believe affect the level of deterrence engendered by the competition 
policy of a jurisdiction, and hence its effectiveness. We have calculated separate indexes for each of 
the three possible competition law infringements (i.e. hard-core cartels, abuses of dominance and 
agreements other than hard-core cartels) and for mergers to take into account the differences in the 
legal framework and, where possible, in the enforcement.20 
 
Each piece of information was assigned a score on a scale of 0-1 against a benchmark of generally 
agreed best practice (from worst to best). When a data entry was quantitative it was normalised by 
dividing it by the highest corresponding value held by any CAs in the sample, so that even 
quantitative information could assume a value between 0-1. More details on how the scores have 
been assigned can be found in the following subsections. 
 
When an index included more than one piece of information, these (or more precisely their scores) 
were weighted and summed together to obtain a single value for each low-level index. The weights 
used for the aggregation of the scores were based on our own evaluation of the importance of the 
various data. Details on how the subjective weights were chosen can be found at the end of this 
section (in subsection 4.9).  
                                                 
20 This was not always easy. For example the CAs rarely have separate divisions that deal with the different types of 
infringements, hence we could not obtain separate data on the resources employed to police each one. 
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In order to check whether our choice of the weights had a decisive influence on the results, we also 
used a different set of weights, generated by a statistical technique: the factor analysis. This 
robustness check has shown that the results do not significantly vary, even when an alternative set 
of weights is employed (see section 8 for more details).  
4.1 The structure of the low-level indexes 
Table 1 below shows the content of each one of the low-level indexes we have built. The numbers 
in brackets refer to the weights used to sum up the information contained in each index. 
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Table 1: The low-level indexes 
Abuses Hard-core Cartels Other anti-competitive 
agreements 
Mergers 
Independence: 
Nature of prosecutor 
(1/2) 
Nature of adjudicator and 
role of government (1/2) 
Independence: 
Nature of prosecutor 
(1/2) 
Nature of adjudicator and 
role of government (1/2) 
Independence: 
Nature of prosecutor 
(1/2) 
Nature of adjudicator and 
role of government (1/2) 
Independence: 
Nature of bodies involved in 
Phase 1 and 2  (1/2) 
Role of government in 
decision (1/2) 
Separation of powers: 
Separation between 
adjudicator and prosecutor  
(2/3) 
Nature of appeal court 
(1/3) 
Separation of powers: 
Separation between 
adjudicator and prosecutor  
(2/3) 
Nature of appeal court 
(1/3) 
Separation of powers: 
Separation between 
adjudicator and prosecutor   
(2/3) 
Nature of appeal court 
(1/3) 
Separation of powers: 
Separation between 
adjudicator and prosecutor  
(1/3) 
Separation between Phase 1 
and 2   (1/3) 
Nature of appeal court (1/3) 
Quality of the law: 
Standard of proof for 
predation and goals that 
inform decision  (1/2) 
Standard of proof for 
refusal to deal and goals 
that inform decision  (1/2) 
Quality of the law: 
Standard of proof and goals 
that inform decision 
(1/2) 
Leniency program  (1/2) 
Quality of the law: 
Standard of proof for 
exclusive contracts and 
goals that inform decision 
Quality of the law: 
Obligation to notify  (1/2) 
Efficiency clause   (1/2) 
Powers during 
investigation: 
Combination of powers 
(3/4) 
Availability of interim 
measures   (1/4) 
Powers during 
investigation: 
Combination of powers 
Powers during 
investigation: 
Combination of powers 
(3/4) 
Availability of interim 
measures   (1/4) 
 
Sanction policy and 
damages: 
Sanctions to firms   (1/3) 
Sanctions to individuals 
(1/3) 
Private actions   (1/3) 
Sanction policy and 
damages: 
Sanctions to firms   (1/3) 
Sanctions to individuals 
(1/3) 
Private actions   (1/3) 
Sanction policy and 
damages: 
Sanctions to firms   (1/3) 
Sanctions to individuals 
(1/3) 
Private actions  (1/3) 
 
Resources: 
Budget    (1/2) 
Staff      (1/4) 
Staff skills (1/4) 
Resources: 
Budget    (1/2) 
Staff      (1/4) 
Staff skills (1/4) 
Resources: 
Budget    (1/2) 
Staff      (1/4) 
Staff skills (1/4) 
Resources: 
Budget    (1/2) 
Staff      (1/4) 
Staff skills (1/4) 
 Sanctions and cases: 
Number of cases opened 
(1/3) 
Max jail term imposed 
(2/3) 
 Cases: 
Number of mergers examined 
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4.2 Independence of the competition authorities 
An important determinant of the effectiveness of a competition policy regime is the independence 
of the CA with respect to political or economic interests. A CA which takes into account interests 
that are (potentially) in contrast with those that should guide its activity is more likely to commit 
errors when reaching decisions.21  
 
This index measures the independence of a CA by considering its institutional status, as well as the 
role that the government plays in the adjudication of competition infringements and in the 
assessment of mergers.  
 
With respect to competition cases, in some jurisdictions separate bodies are responsible for the 
investigation of a case and for its adjudication. Hence, this low-level index has two components: 
 
i) the institutional nature of the body that performs the investigation, and 
ii) the institutional nature of the body that makes the decision and the role of the government in this 
decision-making process. 
 
i) A jurisdiction scores 1 when the body that performs the investigation has total statutory 
independence, because it is either a court or an independent agency. It scores 0 if it is a ministerial 
agency/department. An intermediate score is given to the case in which the investigation can be 
performed by either an independent agency or a ministerial agency/department.  
 
ii) A jurisdiction scores 1 when the body that takes the decision has total statutory 
independence and the government cannot over-rule a decision by the relevant CA, it scores 0.5 
when the adjudicator has total statutory independence but the government can over-rule a decision, 
and it scores 0 if it is a ministerial agency/ department.  
 
We have given equal weights to each piece of information. 
 
In the case of merger control, there are jurisdictions in which one body first performs a high-level 
evaluation – also referred to as Phase 1 – and another one undertakes, when deemed necessary by 
                                                 
21 See Genoud (2003), Majone (1996), Oliveira et al. (2009), OECD (2003); OECD (2005a), OECD (2005b), and Voigt 
(2007). Gilardi (2003 and 2002) makes a slightly different argument in that he claims that indepedent regulatory and 
competition agencies are more protected from political and electoral influence and thus they can adjust their regulatory 
policies in the long term and create a more stable and predictable regulatory environment.. 
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the first one, a more detailed examination – also referred to as Phase 2.  
 
Hence, in the case of mergers this index includes: 
 
i) the institutional nature of the bodies involved in Phase 1 and Phase 2; and 
ii) the role of the government. 
 
i) A jurisdiction scores 1 when the bodies that reach a decision in Phase 1 and Phase 2 (if these are 
separate) are independent, 0 if both bodies are ministerial agencies/departments, and 0.5 if one is 
independent and the other is not. If there is only one body, the score is 1 if it is independent and 0 if 
it is not. 
 
ii) The score is 1 if the government cannot over-rule a decision on a merger, and 0 if it can. 
 
We have given equal weights to each piece of information. 
4.3 Separation of powers 
A second relevant characteristic is the degree of separation between the body that performs the 
investigation on an allegedly anticompetitive behaviour (or merger) and the one which takes the 
decision on whether the behaviour should be sanctioned (or the merger blocked). The stronger the 
separation between prosecutor and adjudicator (e.g. when the investigation is made by an 
independent public body and the decision by a court) the more balanced the decision is likely to be 
and this, in turn, lowers the probability of an error.22 
 
Similarly it matters whether the appeal court is a specialised body with competence only in 
competition matters or whether it is the appeal body for all judicial decisions.2324 A specialised 
body will be formed by individuals that have competence in those specific subjects and are 
therefore better able to consider all the details and correctly evaluate all evidence when deciding on 
a case. 
 
This low-level index captures information on these elements, more precisely on: 
 
                                                 
22 See Block et al. (2000), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Neven (2006), Posner (1988) and Wils (2004). 
23 By appeal court we mean the court that is responsible for reviewing the decision of the CA. 
24 See OECD (2007). 
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i) the existence of a separation between the adjudicator and the prosecutor, which in our view 
reduces the bias in the decision,  
ii) the nature of the appeal body, and 
iii) only in the case of mergers, whether the body that decides if a merger should undergo a Phase 2 
investigation and the body responsible for undertaking the Phase 2 investigation are separate. 
 
i) A jurisdiction scores 0 when the same body adjudicates and prosecutes, while it scores 1 if these 
two activities are performed by separate bodies.  
ii) A jurisdiction scores 1 when the relevant appeal court specialises in competition matters and 0 
when this court deals with appeals on all kinds of decisions.25  
iii) A jurisdiction scores 0 when the same body performs Phase 1 and Phase 2 investigations, and 
scores 1 when two different bodies undertake the two activities.  
 
In the low-level indexes for the competition law infringements we have given a weight of 2/3 to the 
scores on the degree of separation between adjudicator and prosecutor and a weight of 1/3 to the 
nature of the appeal court. In the index for mergers, where we have three elements, we have given 
equal weight to each of them.  
4.4 Quality of the law 
We have defined deterrence as the prevention of conducts that reduce social welfare, however the 
latter may not always be the conducts that are declared illegal by the competition legislation. Rules 
are indeed imperfect as they can ban conducts that are competitive, or allow conducts that are 
anticompetitive, as they may not correctly reflect the impact that specific conducts have on social 
welfare. Hence, the third policy variable we need to consider is the definition of the quality of these 
rules, i.e. the quality of the law on the books. This is a matter of judgement, which makes 
measuring this policy variable extremely difficult. However, we can observe whether the 
competition legislation (and the soft law that disciplines its actual application, e.g. guidelines) has 
rules that make the partition between legal and illegal conducts closer to their effect on social 
welfare.  
 
                                                 
25  In most jurisdictions, all mergers that undergo some form of control are first subject to a general investigation, 
referred to as Phase 1. Those mergers that raise concerns and that may be blocked or may require remedies, are subject 
to a second more detailed analysis, called a Phase 2 investigation. In some jurisdictions the same body that decides on 
whether a merger should undergo a Phase 2 investigation, also performs on this investigation. In other jurisdictions, a 
separate body is responsible for undertaking the Phase 2 investigation. The decision on the outcome of each 
investigation can be made by the same body that investigates or from a separate one. 
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In the case of antitrust infringements, this index focuses on: 
 
i) the standard of proof that is required when deciding on a specific type of violation, which 
can be a per se prohibition or a rule of reason approach; and  
ii) the goals that inform the decision-making process.  
 
For abuses of dominance, we have considered the standard of proof required for a price 
exclusionary practice, predation, a non-price exclusionary practice, refusal to deal. If in assessing 
each of these alleged abuses a jurisdiction applies a rule of reason standard and it considers only 
economic goals it scores 1, because this means that the CA decides whether there has been an abuse 
on the basis of the effects of the behaviour rather than by relying on set rules. On the other hand, if 
it imposes a per se prohibition a jurisdiction scores 0. An intermediate score applies if the CA 
applies a rule of reason standard, but it also considers non-economic goals when evaluating the 
effects of the action (e.g. the effect of the behaviour on the level of employment).26 
 
For anticompetitive agreements other than hard-core cartels, we have only considered the practice 
of exclusive contracts, because this is very common in most markets. If in assessing such an 
infringement a CA requires that the actual effects of the behaviour are proved, and it considers only 
economic goals when evaluating the effects, it scores 1. If it also considers non-economic goals it 
scores 0.5, and if it imposes a per se prohibition it scores 0.27 
 
For hard-core cartels, instead, a per se ban scores 1, while if the imposition of a sanction requires 
showing that the cartel has had an effect on the market and the CA considers only economic goals, 
the score is 0.5, otherwise, if it considers also non-economic goals the score is 0. The reason why 
the scoring is reversed in the case of cartels is the gravity of this practice and of its consequences, 
which, as is generally agreed, calls for a stricter rule.28 
 
The index for hard-core cartels includes also a second element: the leniency program. A CA that 
has such a program is more likely to discover and deter a higher number of cartels.29 Hence, a 
                                                 
26 See Voigt (2007) 
27 See Voigt (2007) 
28 See Voigt (2007), Motta (2004) and OECD (2002b). 
29 See Aubert et al. (2005), Harrington (2008), ICN (2006), Motta and Polo (2003), Motta (2004), OECD (2002a), 
OECD (2002b), Spagnolo (2000), Spagnolo (2004), and Spagnolo (2008).  
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jurisdiction scores 1 if it has a leniency program for cartel whistleblowers and 0 if it does not. 
 
The merger control index has a different composition as it is based on:  
 
i)  the characteristics of the notification obligation, and  
ii) the criteria used for assessing concentrations. 
 
With regard to notification, the absence of any obligation to notify is scored 0, while a score of 0.33 
is given to the CAs that impose such an obligation but have no minimum threshold, since the lack 
of such a limit renders it more difficult for competition authorities to focus resources on important 
cases. Higher scores are given when there is such a threshold: 0.66 is given to a CA with a 
minimum threshold based on market shares, and 1 to a CA with a minimum threshold based on the 
firms’ turnover.30 The reason why turnover is considered to be best practice is that it is easier to 
apply and is less open to uncertainty. 
 
The application of efficiency considerations in the evaluation of the possible effects of a merger is 
scored 1, because it allows taking into consideration all the economic consequences of the 
concentration on the market and on consumers, and not just its effect on competition. The absence 
of any efficiency defence is scored 0. 
 
We have given equal weights to both elements. 
4.5 Powers during investigations 
This index, which is calculated only for competition law infringements, measures the type of 
powers a CA holds during the investigation phase. These include the power to impose, or request, 
interim measures, that allows preventing any anticompetitive behaviour from leading to serious and 
irreversible damages while a final decision is being reached. Furthermore, they include the powers 
to gather information by inspecting the premises of the firms under investigation and the private 
premises of their employees, as well as by wiretapping conversations. The stronger the latter 
powers, the more and the better the information at the CA’s disposal is, and thus the higher the 
probability of detection and the lower the probability of errors, especially type II errors.  
 
With respect to interim measures, a jurisdiction scores 1 if it has interim measures and 0 if it does 
                                                 
30 See ICN (2006). 
 15
not. With regard to information gathering powers, a jurisdiction scores 1 if both business and 
private premises can be inspected, 0 if none of them can be inspected, and 0.5 if only business 
premises can be inspected, as the wider the powers the more thorough the investigation. 
 
We have given a weight of 1/4 to the availability of interim measures and of 3/4 to the types of 
information gathering powers held by the CAs.  
 
With respect to hard-core cartels, the power to impose interim measures is not relevant. Hence, this 
index only measures the types of powers to gather information.  
 
The reason why we did not have this low-level index for mergers is that investigative powers are 
not very relevant in merger cases because these are ex-ante investigations which do not involve 
infringement of legal obligations, but rather a request for approval for a business operation.  
4.6 Sanctions and damages  
One important element in deterring anticompetitive behaviours is the credible threat of financial 
losses that firms (and their employees) can expect to suffer as a consequence of a conviction.31 This 
low-level index considers: the range of potential sanctions that offenders (both firms and their 
employees) are faced with and whether affected parties can sue for damages. These losses are 
determined by the sum of the sanctions that can be imposed by the CA, and/or the court, (e.g. fines, 
imprisonment, disqualification, damages), to which it is necessary to add any damage repayment to 
the affected parties, because what determines the behaviour of a firm are the total losses imposed by 
a given course of action.  
 
It is important to highlight that the level of the financial loss depends on two elements: the law on 
the books and how this is enforced. For example, the sanctions imposed by the CA (or a court) 
depend: on the criteria set out in the law regarding the type of sanctions and maximum level they 
can reach, and on how these criteria are applied (i.e. their enforcement). If the monetary fine can 
reach up to 10% of the turnover of a firm, but no fine of this level has ever been imposed, even 
when a serious breach of the law took place, firms will not expect to have to pay such a figure, 
despite what the law says. This index only refers to what is set out in the law. We have considered 
separately the level that the sanctions have effectively reached. 
                                                 
31 Landes (1983); Simon and Werden (1987), Craycraft et al. (1994), Craycraft et al. (1997), Connor (2005), Geradin 
(2005), Kobayashi (2002), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), Schinkel (2007). 
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No sanctions are imposed following merger investigations, hence there is no such index for 
mergers.32 
 
With regard to the sanctions that can be imposed on firms, this index considers how the maximum 
level of the fine is set: the score is 1 if this limit is expressed as a proportion of the turnover of the 
offending firm or of the illicit gain obtained from the infringement, 0.66 if the level of the fine is 
left to the discretion of the adjudicator, 0.33 if the maximum level of the fine is set in absolute 
terms, and 0 if no fines are imposed.33  
 
For the abuses of dominance index we have also included the types of sanctions that can be 
imposed. A jurisdiction scores 0 if neither monetary fines nor structural remedies can be imposed, 1 
if both are allowed, and 0.75 if only monetary sanctions are possible. To obtain a single score for 
the sanction to firms we have given a weight of 1/3 to the type of possible sanctions and of 2/3 to 
the criterion for its calculation.34  
 
With regard to sanctions on the employees of the offending firms, the index considers both the 
types of sanctions and their maximum level: 
 
- for monetary fines, the score is 0 if no such fines can be imposed and 1 if there is no explicit 
limit to this type of sanctions; instead, if there is a maximum value set by law, the score is the 
normalisation of this value, which is obtained by dividing this value by the maximum value in 
the sample. 
- for disqualification, the score is 1 if the employee can be disqualified from the position of 
director and 0 if this is not possible. 
- for jail sentences, the score is 0 if the individual cannot be imprisoned; in all other cases, the 
score is the maximum jail term that the courts can impose, divided by the longest jail term 
available in any jurisdiction enclosed in the sample. 
 
To obtain a single score for this element of the index, we have given a weight of 3/10 to monetary 
fines, a weight of 2/10 to disqualification and a weight of 5/10 to imprisonment.  
                                                 
32 There are fines only for breaching procedural obligations, such as the duty to notify (when this exists), and for 
completing a merger that was prohibited. 
33 See OECD (2002a) and OECD (2002b). 
34 See OECD (2002a) and OECD (2002b). 
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With regard to private actions, the score is 0 if no private actions are possible, while it is 1 if both 
affected firms and affected individuals can appeal to a court for a damage payment and if class 
actions are possible. The intermediate scores 0.33 and 0.66 are given only if the affected firms, or 
both the affected individuals and the affected firms respectively, can undertake a private action, but 
class actions are not available. 
 
The overall index is composed in equal parts by the scores of these three elements. 
4.7 Resources 
The effectiveness of the enforcement activity of a CA is likely to be affected by the financial and 
human resources devoted to it. This index measures both the quantity of these resources, i.e. budget 
and total staff of the CAs, and their quality, more specifically the number of economists with a 
relevant PhD and of qualified lawyers. When a jurisdiction has two CAs we have considered both 
their resources jointly. Since all this data is quantitative we normalised the original data between 0-
1 in the following way: 
 
- the budget was divided by the nominal GDP of the country (both expressed in US$ 
using PPP exchange rates), so as to allow a comparison between countries of different 
sizes and levels of economic development. This value was then divided by the highest 
corresponding value held by any CAs in the sample.  
- the number of staff members was divided by the real GDP of the country, again to 
allow a meaningful comparison between countries. This value was then divided by the 
highest corresponding value held by any CAs in the sample. 
- both the number of economists with a PhD and the number of qualified lawyers were 
divided by the number of total staff. This value was then divided by the highest 
corresponding value held by any CAs in the sample. 
 
We have given a weight of 1/2 to the budget data, a weight of 1/4 to the data on the total staff and a 
weight of 1/4 to the data on the composition of this staff. 
 
This index has the same value for all the three possible infringements, as well as for merger control, 
because we do not have separate data on the resources devoted to each type of practices. This is due 
to many CAs not having separate divisions that deal with different types of behaviours and/or not 
keeping a record of the personnel and resources of different divisions. 
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4.8 Sanctions and cases 
How effective sanctions are as a deterrent depends not just on their type and level as set in the law, 
but also on the strictness of sanctions that have actually been issued. Unfortunately, data on this 
subject are scarce.35 We managed to obtain only some data for hard-core cartels. These refer to the 
maximum jail term imposed on the employees of the offending firms (for those countries in which 
such a sanction is possible). In order to score this data we have divided the relevant figure by the 
highest one imposed by any CAs in the sample. 
 
The credibility of a CA in preventing anticompetitive behaviours/mergers also depends on how 
active it is in assessing mergers and investigating complaints of infringements. This level of activity 
has been proxied with the number of cartels investigations opened and the number of mergers 
examined, each divided by the real GDP of the relevant country, as the size of the economy can 
have an impact on the absolute number of anticompetitive behaviours. We have normalised this 
ratio by dividing it by the highest one in the sample.36 When a country has two CAs we have 
considered the number of cartel investigations performed by both of them. 
 
For hard-core cartels we have given a weight of 2/3 to the data on the jail term and 1/3 to the 
number of cases investigated. 
4.9 Rationale behind the subjective weights 
Above, we have indicated the weights that we used to aggregate the single pieces of information to 
construct the low-level indexes. We now explain how we selected them. 
 
The general rule we have followed is a sort of “Principle of insufficient reason”, whereby whenever 
we had no specific reasons to believe that one feature mattered more than others, we gave equal 
weights to all elements in the low-level index. 37 There are six cases in which this neutrality rule 
was not applied. These are explained below.  
 
                                                 
35 CAs do not keep easily accessible records of fines and other sanctions, especially if one wants to relate them to 
seriousness and the duration of the infringement or to the magnitude of the affected commerce. In addition, in most 
instances, the CAs’ decisions have been appealed and it is difficult to track down the outcome of the appeal, which is 
the one that really matters. This element of the indicator could benefit from further work. 
36 The reason why we have not also included the number of cases of other types of antitrust infringements is that, 
unfortunately, it has proved impossible to collect consistent data on the number of investigations carried out on abuses 
and agreements other than cartels. 
37 For a discussion of this principle in statistics in a historical perspective see Stigler (1966). The principle of 
insufficient reason was renamed the “principle of indifference” by Keynes (1921). A succinct source is 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_indifference 
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1) In the low-level indexes on the separation of powers for all antitrust infringements, “Separation 
between adjudicator and prosecutor” is weighted 2/3, while “Nature of appeal court” is 
weighted only 1/3. The rationale behind this choice is that the appeal court does not intervene in 
all cases, as the undertaking may not appeal. In addition the appeal decision is taken much later, 
with respect to the decision of the CA. Hence, the nature of an appeal court should have a 
weaker and less certain influence on the effectiveness of a competition policy regime. 
 
2) In the low-level indexes on the powers to investigate for abuses of dominance and for 
agreements other than cartels, “Availability of interim measures” has been given a weight 1/4, 
while “Combination of powers” has been given a weight of 3/4. This choice rests on the fact 
that, while the latter is crucial for the CAs intervention since it affects how thorough an 
investigation can be, the former only affects the timeliness of the intervention, but does not alter 
the probability of errors. 
 
3) In the low-level indexes on sanctions and damages for abuses of dominance, the sanctions on 
firms include two elements: the types of sanctions that can be imposed and their level. To obtain 
a single score we have given a weight of 1/3 to the type of possible sanctions and of 2/3 to the 
criterion for its calculation, because we believe that the latter has a stronger impact on 
deterrence.38 
 
4) In the low-level indexes on sanctions and damages, we have different types of sanctions that can 
be imposed on offending individuals. To obtain a single score we have given a weight of 3/10 to 
monetary fines, a weight of 2/10 to disqualification and a weight of 5/10 to imprisonment. 
These weights are based on our view that monetary fines can be paid by the companies the 
individuals work for, while prison sentences have to be undergone by the individuals found 
guilty. 
 
5) In the low-level indexes on resources we have given a weight of 1/2 to the budget data, a weight 
of 1/4 to the data on the total staff and a weight of 1/4 to the data on the composition of this 
staff. The reason is that we believe that the monetary resources are those that affect the most the 
means that a CA has to undertake its investigative and enforcement activities. 
 
                                                 
38 The reason why we believe that the criterion for setting the level of the fine is so important is that this affects the 
most the incentives faced by a firm in the course of its decision process. 
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6) In the low-level indexes on cases for hard-core cartels we have given a weight of 2/3 to the data 
on the maximum jail term and 1/3 to the number of cases investigated, because we believe that 
the former data is more important in signalling the toughness of a competition regime. 
 
5 The construction of the medium-level indexes 
 
The next step in the construction of the CPIs consisted of vertically aggregating the low-level 
indexes to obtain, for each type of infringement and for mergers, a medium-level index that 
encompasses all the information on the institutional features as well as a medium-level index that 
encompasses all the information on the enforcement features. 
 
The value of each of these eight medium-level indexes is given by the weighted average of the low-
level indexes they comprise. These weights are shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: The medium-level indexes 
 Abuses Hard-core Cartels Other agreements Mergers 
Institutional 
features 
Independence    
 (1/6) 
 
Separation of 
powers (1/6) 
 
Quality of the law 
(1/6) 
 
Powers during 
investigation  
(1/6) 
 
Sanctions and 
damages  
(1/3) 
Independence    
 (1/6) 
 
Separation of 
powers (1/6) 
 
Quality of the law 
(1/6) 
 
Powers during 
investigation  
(1/6) 
 
Sanctions and 
damages  
(1/3) 
Independence    
 (1/6) 
 
Separation of 
powers (1/6) 
 
Quality of the law 
(1/6) 
 
Powers during 
investigation  
(1/6) 
 
Sanctions and 
damages 
 (1/3) 
Independence    
 (1/3) 
 
Separation of 
powers  
(1/3) 
 
Quality of the law 
(1/3) 
Enforcement 
features 
Resources 
Resources  
(2/3) 
 
Cases 
 (1/3) 
Resources 
Resources  
(2/3) 
 
Cases  
(1/3) 
 
 
The weights have been chosen so as to attribute greater importance to the low-level indexes that 
incorporate the most important policy features. Hence, in the institutional feature index for all three 
antitrust infringements “sanctions and damages” has been given a weight of 1/3, while the other 
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features have a weight of 1/6. This is due to the fact that sanctions seem to have a stronger impact 
on deterrence39. Whereas in the enforcement feature index, the data on the number of cases, where 
available, has been given a lower weight because we believe that the resources are better indicators 
of how active a CA is in its competition enforcement activities. 
 
6 The construction of the high-level indexes 
 
The last step consisted of aggregating the medium-level indexes in a set of high-level indexes, the 
CPIs, that incorporate all the information on the deterrence effect of the competition policy regime 
in a jurisdiction in a specific year. 
 
We have calculated one index, the Antitrust CPI, that measures the deterrence effect of the 
competition policy with regard to all antitrust infringement, which is given by the weighted average 
of all the medium-level indexes relative to antitrust infringements, and one, the Mergers CPI, that 
measures the deterrence effect of the competition policy with regard to the mergers, which is given 
by the weighted average of two medium-level indexes relative to merger control.  
 
We have also calculated one index, the Institutional CPI, which measures the deterrence effect of 
the institutional features of a competition policy regime, which is given by the weighted average of 
the four medium-level indexes relative to the institutional features. Further, we calculated one 
index, the Enforcement CPI, which measures the deterrence effect of the enforcement features of a 
competition policy regime, which is given by the weighted average of four medium-level indexes 
relative to the enforcement features. 
 
Finally, we calculated an index that incorporates all the information on the deterrence effect of the 
competition policy regime in a jurisdiction in a specific year (the Aggregate CPI). 
 
Table 3 below shows these CPIs and the weights (in brackets) used in the aggregation process. 
                                                 
39  See Levitt (2001), Levitt (1998) and Levitt and Miles (2006). 
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Table 3: the CPIs  
Aggregate CPI 
Antitrust CPI  
(3/4)  
Hard-core Cartels 
(1/3) 
Abuses  
 (1/3) 
Other agreements  
 (1/3) 
Merger CPI  
(1/4) 
Institutional CPI 
(2/3) 
Institutional 
features of hard-
core cartels 
Institutional 
features of abuses
Institutional 
features of other 
agreements 
Institutional 
features of 
mergers 
Enforcement CPI 
(1/3) 
Enforcement 
features of hard-
core cartels 
Enforcement 
features of abuses
Enforcement 
features of other 
agreements 
Enforcement 
features of 
mergers 
 
7 The data  
In the previous sections (from section 3 to 6) we described the structure of the CPIs and the 
methodology we used for building them. In this section we explain how we collected the data on the 
relevant competition policy features that we have employed to calculate the CPIs.  
 
Most of the data were obtained directly from the CAs operating in the 13 jurisdiction included in 
our sample. 40  We submitted a tailored questionnaire to each of them with questions on the 
institutional framework of their competition policy regime and on how this evolved over time (to 
capture any changes that happened over the ten year period 1995-2005). In addition, we asked them 
about the quantity and quality of the resources they employed to enforce the competition legislation 
over that time period, as well as about the sanctions imposed on firms and their employees and the 
cases/mergers they have investigated. The data from this survey were integrated with information 
derived from the country studies carried out by the OECD in the context of its reviews of regulatory 
reforms, from the chapters on competition and economic performance in the OECD Economic 
Surveys and from the CAs’ own websites. 
                                                 
40 We surveyed only the CAs which are either independent public bodies or ministerial agencies/departments, and did 
not survey the courts (though we collected data on their powers and activities). The bodies surveyed are: Competition 
Bureau (Canada); Urad pro ochranu hospodarske souteze (Czech Republic); Directorate General for Competition 
Affairs (European Union); Conseil de la Concurrence (France); Direction Générale de la Concurrence (France); 
Bundeskartellaamt (Germany); Gazdasági Versenyhivatal (Hungary); Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 
(Italy); Japan Fair Trade Commission (Japan); Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands); Servicio de Defensa 
de la Competencia (Spain); Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (Spain); Konkurrensverket (Sweden); Office of Fair 
trading (UK); Competition Commission (UK), Federal Trade Commission (US); Antitrust Division - Department of 
Justice (US).  
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7.1 Missing data 
Despite the active collaboration of most CAs, it was not possible to collect all data on the 
enforcement characteristics of the competition policy necessary to build the CPIs for the period 
considered (1995-2005). Hence our database had some missing observations. 
 
In order to fill them in, we asked the CAs to provide us with an imputation of the missing 
observations based either on other data at their disposal or on their historical knowledge of the 
trends. When this was not possible, we performed some limited imputation of the missing data, 
whenever this was allowed by the characteristics of the other available data on that specific feature.  
 
More specifically we performed two types of imputation. The first consisted of extending a series of 
data over time, if we had enough data (at least five observations) and if it was possible to trace a 
clear trend in them. For example, if we had data on the level of a CA’s budget from 1996 to 2000 
(i.e. 5 years) and this was constantly growing, we could calculate the budget for 2001 and 2002 
using the average growth rate observed in the available data. We would calculate only two of the 
missing data because we believe that our imputation should not exceed 50% (i.e. since we had 5 
observations we could calculate 2 more, whereas if we had had 7 observations we could have 
calculated 3 missing ones). The second consisted of exploiting the information from other data to 
impute a different, unavailable, series of data. We used this imputation criterion only for two 
specific variables: the level of a CA’s budget for competition activities and the number of its staff 
devoted to competition activities. Where we only had data on the budget for competition activities, 
but not on the staff and had data on the overall budget of the CA and on the total staff employed by 
the CA, we used the ratio between the budget in competition activities and the total budget to 
impute the fraction of the staff employed in competition activity.  
 
Despite this work, we were not able to fill all the existing gaps. This means that in some cases we 
did not have all the information necessary to calculate a specific index. To avoid calculating indexes 
whose value could be altered by the lack of information, we decided not to calculate an index (both 
at the low, medium and high level of the pyramid) if 50% or more of the relevant information 
content was missing. For example, the low-level index on resources includes information on the 
CA’s budget with a weight of 1/2, on quality of its staff with a weight of 1/4, and on the 
composition of its staff with a weight of 1/4. If for a given country in a given year we did not have 
the data on the level of the budget we would not calculate this index because half of the information 
content was missing, whereas, if we had no information on the composition of the staff, we would 
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still calculate the index as only a quarter of the information content would be missing, i.e. we would 
be above the 50% threshold.  
 
We have accepted only one exception to this rule, in that we did not calculate the Aggregate CPI if 
we could not calculate the relevant Enforcement CPI, even if this just accounted for 1/3 of the 
overall information content of the Aggregate one. We decided that in the case of the Aggregate CPI 
it was important to have data on both institutional and enforcement features.  
7.2 The EU 
Our sample includes 9 European countries, which are part of the European Union.41 Hence, in these 
countries the EU competition policy works alongside their national competition policy. This means 
that, in order to correctly evaluate the effectiveness of the competition policy regime in each 
Member State it is necessary to consider both the national and the EU regime. Therefore for these 
countries, we have also built a set of CPIs, which incorporate information on both the national and 
the EU competition policy.  
 
However, since we have no information on the EU enforcement features, we have only been able to 
calculate this set of index for the institutional features. These indexes have been calculated as the 
simple average of the country’s Institutional CPI and the EU’s Institutional CPI. 
8 Robustness of the indexes  
The construction of the CPIs contains a crucial element of subjective evaluation, which consists of 
the set of weights employed to combine the information gathered at each level of aggregation. 
There is thus a risk that the value of the CPIs may be driven by the subjective weighting scheme 
adopted. 
In the previous sections we justified our choice of weights (see section 4.9). Nonetheless, to verify 
if the CPIs are sensitive to the weighting scheme adopted, we have employed a statistical technique, 
the factor analysis, to derive a new set of CPIs where the weights assigned to each piece of 
information are totally driven by the characteristics of the data themselves. The factor analysis is a 
statistical method which groups together variables that are highly correlated (and thus, to some 
extent, redundant) into a number of latent factors. The most important output of the factor analysis 
                                                 
41 These jurisdictions are France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and since 2004 also Czech 
Republic and Hungary. 
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is the matrix of loadings. The loadings measure the correlation between the variables and the 
factors, and allow the assignment of each variable to a given factor based on the strength of their 
correlation. Different techniques can be used within the framework of factor analysis to compute 
the loadings and to estimate factors. Our analysis is based on the methodology employed by the 
OECD when calculating the PMR indicators.42  
 
This methodology involves a number of steps:  
 
1. The first step consists of grouping the variables according to different areas of the competition 
policy: hard-core cartels, abuses, other agreements, and mergers, with no distinction between 
institutional and enforcement features.  
 
2. The second step consists of extracting the factors – i.e. identifying the number of factors 
necessary to represent the original data – using the principal component method. With this 
method, the factors are chosen so that the first one explains as much information contained in 
the original data as possible; the second factor is orthogonal to the first and explains as much 
residual information as possible, and so on. The exact number of factors that should be retained 
can be decided by the researcher. Yet, usually one keeps adding factors until the explanatory 
power of the last factor included remains above a certain threshold43. 
 
3. The third step consists of the rotation of the factors, which permits a better interpretation of the 
results. The rotation allows us to get loadings that are closer to 1 or 0, thus allowing us to more 
easily assign a selected variable to a unique factor. We have used the varimax rotation 
technique, which preserves the orthogonality between the factors.  
 
4. The fourth step consists of the construction of the factors. We have constructed the factors as 
the weighted average of the original variables, where the weights are the normalised squared 
factor loadings of each variables.  
 
5. The fifth step consists of the aggregation of the factors in order to have a single indicator for 
each of the areas of the competition policy (hard-core cartels, abuses, other agreements, and 
                                                 
42 Nicoletti et. al (2005) 
43 The threshold is set with reference to the value of the eigenvalue associated to each factor. The level of threshold is 
set by default in most applications and statistical packages (e.g. STATA, which we used) that perform factor analyses to 
the value of 1. 
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merger control). The factors are weighted according to the proportion of the overall variance of 
the data explained by each one and summed one to the other..  
 
6. Finally, we run the factor analysis on these four indicators again (repeating the procedure 
described above) to calculate the aggregate CPI. 
 
The following table shows the output of the factor analysis for one of the areas of competition 
policy: hard-core cartels. 
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Table 4: The output of the factor analysis for features relative to one competition policy 
area: hard-core cartels 
Variable
Factor 
Loadings
Weights of variables 
in factor  (2)
Factor 
Loadings
Weights of variables 
in factor  (2)
Factor 
Loadings
Weights of variables 
in factor  (2)
Factor 
Loadings
Weights of variables 
in factor  (2)
Nature of prosecutor -0.7047 0.1593 0.0749 0.0023 -0.0284 0.0004 0.5633 0.1704
Nature of adjudicator and role of 
government -0.2838 0.0258 0.8378 0.2873 -0.0046 0.0000 0.1088 0.0064
Standard of proof and goals that 
inform decision 0.0586 0.0011 0.0230 0.0002 -0.1206 0.0071 0.92 0.4546
Leniency program 0.3018 0.0292 0.4393 0.0790 0.5802 0.1648 0.1506 0.0122
Combination of powers 0.2794 0.0250 0.8177 0.2736 0.0708 0.0025 -0.1996 0.0214
Sanctions to firms  -0.2737 0.0240 0.5991 0.1469 -0.3618 0.0641 0.1013 0.0055
Sanctions to individuals-monetary
0.3896 0.0487 0.3527 0.0509 0.2585 0.0327 -0.6135 0.2022
Sanctions to individuals-Jail 0.6711 0.1444 0.4951 0.1003 -0.0414 0.0008 -0.2531 0.0344
Sanction to individuals-Private 
actions  0.9083 0.2646 -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0968 0.0046 0.0724 0.0028
Nature of appeal court  -0.6444 0.1332 0.2780 0.0316 0.3240 0.0514 -0.0972 0.0051
Separation between adjudicator 
and prosecutor 0.5056 0.0820 -0.2446 0.0245 0.5020 0.1234 -0.2603 0.0364
Budget       -0.1888 0.0114 -0.0740 0.0022 0.8484 0.3524 -0.1684 0.0152
Staff    -0.4 0.0513 0.0519 0.0011 0.6323 0.1958 -0.2493 0.0334
Weight of Factors in Summary 
indicators (3) 0.3294 0.2581 0.2158 0.1967
Total variance explained by the 
factors 0.7281
1) Based on rotated component matrix
2) Normalised squared factor loadings 
3) Normalised sum of squared loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
  
 
In the first column of Table 4, we report the entire list of variables on which the factor analysis has 
been performed. All the institutional and the enforcement variables have been included. The 
principal component method allows us to identify four separate factors that capture 73% of the 
variability in the original data. The columns called factor loading show the loadings for each factor, 
which measure the correlation between each variable and that specific factor, while the third 
columns, called weights of variables, show the weights that each variable gets in the computation of 
the factor, based on the normalised squared of the factor loadings. The four factors are then 
aggregated as a weighted sum, where the weight is proportional to the explanatory power of the 
factor with respect to the original data, captured by the normalised sum of the squared factor 
loadings.  
 
A similar procedure is used for the other areas of competition policy: abuses, other agreements and 
mergers. Then, we run the factor analysis on the results again to obtain the aggregate CPI.  
9 Results 
In the previous sections we analysed in some detail the structure of the CPIs. Here we present the 
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results we obtained when applying this methodology to our database.  
 
We start by showing, in Figures 1 to 6, the values of the Institutional CPIs and of the Enforcement 
CPIs for the jurisdictions in our sample over the period 1995-2005. 44  To allow a clearer 
interpretation of the results we have included only a limited number of jurisdictions in each figure. 
Yet, to allow readers to easily perform comparisons among them, we have reported the simple 
average in each figure. 
Figure 1 shows the Institutional CPIs for the three OECD countries in our sample that are not part 
of the EU.  
Figure 1: The Institutional CPIs for the non-EU countries in our sample: Canada, Japan 
and the US 
 
 
The Institutional CPIs of the non-EU countries in our sample remained relatively stable over the 
period under exam, but they differ considerably among each other: the one for the US has very high 
values, which are constantly among the highest in the sample and well above the sample average; 
the values for Canada are also above the sample average, while Japan’s values are very low.  
 
Japan consistently has the lowest Institutional CPIs for the entire sample period. The reason behind 
                                                 
44 We were not able to collect any data on the enforcement features for the European Union, hence we could not 
calculate the Enforcement CPI for this jurisdiction. 
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Japan’s low performance is manifold. First, Japan suffers from the lack of a leniency program for 
cartels’ whistleblowers. Second, in Japan there is no separation between the body that prosecutes 
violators of the antitrust law and the body that adjudicates such cases. Further elements are the 
absence of the possibility to start a class action and the fact that the Japanese competition legislation 
envisages the consideration of non strictly-economic goals when assessing the effects of abuses of 
dominance.  
 
The index for Canada shows a rise between 1998 and 2000. This improvement in the institutional 
features of the competition policy can be attributed to two major policy changes: the introduction in 
1999 of the power to wiretap during investigations on alleged antitrust infringements and the 
introduction of a leniency program in 2000.  
Figure 2 shows the Enforcement CPIs for the same countries.  
Figure 2: The Enforcement CPIs for the non-EU countries in our sample: Canada, Japan 
and the US  
 
 
 
While the Institutional CPIs tend to be stable over time, because institutional changes are less 
frequent, the evolution of the Enforcement CPIs for the three non-EU countries exhibits more cross-
time variation.  
 
In addition the ranking is different, with respect to Figure 1, as Canada is now the country with the 
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highest values. The main reason why Canada has higher values than the US is due to the size of the 
annual budget for competition activities (relative to the country’s GDP) and the number of the CA’s 
employees (relative to the country’s GDP). However, this gap tends to shrink over time and, by the 
end of our sample period, is almost closed.  
 
Japan also shows very low values for the Enforcement CPIs. This is due to the low level of the 
human and financial resources available to the CA. The drop that can be observed between 1997 
and 1999 is due to a strong reduction in the number of mergers examined by the Japanese CA, due 
to a change in legislation that modified the criteria for the notification of mergers. 
Figure 3 depicts the Institutional CPIs for the large EU member states in our sample and for the EU 
itself. 
Figure 3: The Institutional CPIs for the large EU countries in our sample: France, EU, 
Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK 
 
 
As we can see, the CPIs for Spain, France and Italy are consistently below the sample average, 
while Germany shows a much better performance. The CPIs for the EU and the UK start below the 
average, but over time grow enough to overcome it.  
 
The most interesting features of this picture are the changes that characterise three of the 
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jurisdictions. The CPI for the UK jumps from the lowest level to a level well above the sample 
average. This is due to the major changes that accompanied the introduction of the Competition Act 
in 2000. Both Spain and France experience a substantial improvement between 2000 and 2003. The 
former benefited from the introduction of class action in 2001 and of the powers to investigate 
business premises in 2003. In the latter, the quality of the institutional CPI improved because of the 
introduction of a leniency program for cartels’ whistleblowers and because of the obligation to 
notify mergers. 
 
Finally, the Institution CPIs for the EU shows two upward jumps in 1996 and in 2004. The first one 
in 1996 is due to the introduction of a leniency programme for cartels’ whistleblowers, while the 
second in 2004 is the result of the introduction of the power to inspect private premises in the 
investigation of hard-core cartels and abuses. 
Figure 4 depicts the Enforcement CPIs for the same subset of jurisdictions. The figure does not 
include the EU, as we were not able to collect data on its enforcement features.  
Figure 4: The Enforcement CPIs for the large EU countries in our sample: France, Italy, 
Germany, Spain and the UK 
 
 
The first element to notice in this figure is that the data for the first five years in the sample are 
missing for Spain and France. This lack of information does not allow to have a clear picture of the 
trend for these two jurisdictions. The second is that, with respect to the enforcement characteristics 
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of the competition policy, Germany now ranks well below Italy and the UK. This is partially due to 
the fact that less financial resources are available to the German CA, and also to its limited number 
of employees (with respect to the UK) and their lower level of skills (with respect to Italy). A final 
relevant aspect to notice is the consistent improvement in the overall deterrence effect of the 
enforcement features of the competition policy in the UK, as the introduction of the Competition 
Act in 2000 was accompanied by a steady growth in the financial and human resources available to 
the two CAs.  
 
Figure 5 depicts the Institutions CPIs for the small EU countries in our sample. 
Figure 5: The Institutional CPIs for the small EU countries in our sample: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden 
 
 
Sweden is consistently the country with the highest Institutional CPI values not just in this group 
but in the whole sample. The institutional CPIs for the other jurisdictions start below the sample 
average. However, both the Czech Republic and Hungary improve over time and move above the 
average. The Czech Republic experiences a first, considerable shift in 1996, due to the CA 
acquiring independence from the government – previously all decisions were taken by a ministerial 
department. A further improvement takes place in 2004, when the power to investigate business 
premises is introduced. In Hungary the major increase happens in 2000, and can be attributed to an 
increase in the investigative powers of the CA and to a shift in the criterion used to set the sanctions 
for antitrust infringements, which changed from a discretionary decision left to the adjudicator to an 
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approach based on the firm’s turnover.  
 
The Netherlands did not have a CA before 1998. Hence, it was not possible to calculate a CPI until 
that year. In subsequent years the index has been substantially stable. It experiences only a small 
jump in 2002, due to the introduction of a leniency program for cartels’ whistleblowers. 
Figure 6 depicts the Enforcement CPIs for the same subset of jurisdictions. 
Figure 6: The Enforcement CPIs for the small EU countries in our sample: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden 
 
 
Again, Sweden shows the highest values of the Enforcement CPI in the first half of the sample 
period, yet these consistently decline over time. The main reason behind this decline is a reduction, 
in real terms, of the financial and human resources available to its CA. The Czech Republic shows a 
constant pattern over the entire sample period, and its Enforcement CPI is always below the sample 
average, while Hungary shows high values and exhibits a substantial improvement in 2002, due to 
an increase in the budget of the CA. The continuous upward trend for the Dutch Enforcement CPI is 
related to a constant increase in the amount and the quality of its CA’s resources. 
 
Figures 1 to 6 give a general idea of the deterrence effect of the competition policy in the 
jurisdictions included in our sample and of the relevant changes occurred over time. It is evident 
from them that there is substantial cross-sectional and cross-time variation in both the Institutional 
and Enforcement CPIs.  
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In Figures 7, 8 and 9 below we show the values of the Aggregate CPIs for the same group of 
countries. We do not comment on these figures, as from the description above it should be clear 
why the indexes follow the patterns observed. However, it should be stressed that the institutional 
component of the aggregate index takes a greater weight (2/3), hence the evolution of the Aggregate 
CPIs is mostly explained by the institutional features of the competition policy. It should once more 
be stressed that we could not calculate the Aggregate CPI for the European Union, as we have not 
been able to collect any data on the enforcement features of this jurisdiction. 
Figure 7: The Aggregate CPIs for the non-EU countries in our sample: Canada, Japan and 
the US 
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Figure 8: The Aggregate CPIs of the large EU member states in our sample: France, Italy, 
Germany, Spain and the UK 
 
 
Figure 9: The Aggregate CPIs of the small EU member states in our sample: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden 
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Table 5 below shows the ranking of the 12 countries in our sample based on the average value of 
their Aggregate CPIs over the years 1995 to 2005 and on its value in 2005. Sweden and the US are 
the best-scoring countries and this is true for each year in the sample, similarly France, Spain and 
Japan constantly have the lowest scores. The UK and Canada are the countries that experience the 
most marked change. Table 6 shows the ranking obtained when the Aggregate CPIs is calculated 
using the weights obtained through the factor analysis.  
Table 5 : The ranking of the countries on the basis of the Aggregate CPIs 
Country Ranking based on average score  Ranking based on 2005 score 
Sweden 1 1 
US 2 2 
Canada 3 6 
Netherlands 4 3 
Hungary 5 5 
Germany 6 8 
Czech Republic 7 7 
UK 8 4 
Spain 9 11 
Italy 10 9 
France 11 10 
Japan 12 12 
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Table 6 : The ranking of the countries on the basis of the factor analysis Aggregate CPIs 
Country Ranking based on average score Ranking based on 2005 score 
Sweden 1 1 
US 2 2 
Germany 3 4 
Canada 4 5 
Hungary 5 6 
UK 6 3 
Czech Republic 7 7 
Netherlands 8 8 
Italy 9 9 
France 10 10 
Spain 11 11 
Japan 12 12 
 
 
The rankings resulting from the use of the two weighting schemes are broadly consistent. Sweden 
and the US rank at the top while France, Spain and Japan lie at the bottom in both tables. Only 
Germany and the Netherlands have a different ranking.  
 
As a further check we have calculated the correlation coefficient between the values of the 
aggregate CPIs built with our weights and the one built with the weights obtained from the factor 
analysis. This coefficient is very high (equal to 0.96) and it is significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. 
10 Comparisons with other similar indicators  
In the literature, few indicators exist that, like the CPIs, try to measure the strength of competition 
regimes.  
 
The OECD, as mentioned in the introduction, has developed a set of CPL indicators (only for the 
year 2003) that try to measure the strength of a country’s policies aimed at preserving and 
promoting competition. These indicators measure both the competition policy, as we have defined it 
in this paper, and the sectoral regulatory policies. 
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The ranking of the CPL indicators, with respect only to the competition policy, differ from the one 
of the aggregate CPIs. Several factors may determine these differences. First, the CPL indicators do 
not include information on some institutional characteristics which are included in the Aggregate 
CPI, namely the extent of powers available for the CAs during the investigations and the separation 
of powers between the prosecutor and the adjudicator. In addition, the CPL indexes attribute a 
relatively greater importance to the independence of the CA. Further, the CPL indexes do not 
rigidly separate the institutional features of a competition policy regime from the enforcement ones. 
For example, potential sanctions, that is, the sanctions envisaged by the national legislation, are 
included among the enforcement features of a competition policy regime together with the actual 
sanctions, whereas in the CPIs these data are kept separate. Another element that might contribute 
to the different rankings of the Aggregate CPIs and the CPL Indexes is the inclusion in the latter of 
more detailed information on the enforcement features of the competition policy regime. This is due 
to the CPL indexes being constructed for a single year, which makes the collection of enforcement 
data substantially easier. 
 
Another set of indicators that has same similarities with the CPIs are the four indicators developed 
by Voigt.45 These indicators focus on the institutional and enforcement features of competition 
regimes, but they are less comprehensive than the CPIs. In addition they do not attempt to 
summarise the key features of a regime in a single index, but are more akin to the low-level indexes 
discussed in section 4 in that each one includes information on a limited aspect of a competition 
regime.46 
 
Also Hilton and Deng have tried to provide a quantitative summary measure of competition law. 
Their objective has been to gauge the size of the overall “competition law net” by collecting 
information on the breadth of the law and on its penalty and defence provisions in 102 countries 
over the time period January 2001 to December 2004.47 Their scope index differs from the CPI in 
that it tries to provide a summary description of the areas covered by competition law rather than an 
evaluation of its quality. Indeed, the scope index does not attempt to measure how the law is 
effectively enforced, nor the degree of independence of the CA or the quality of the law. 48 
                                                 
45 See Voigt (2007). 
46 One indicator evaluates the substantive content of the competition legislation, a second indicator evaluates to what 
degree this legislation adopts an economic – as opposed to a legal – approach, a third indicator reflects the level of the 
formal independence of the CA and a fourth one measures its factual independence. 
47 See Hylton and Deng (2006). 
48  The information collected concerns the geographical scope of competition law, the remedies it allows, the type of 
private enforcement available to the damaged parties, the merger notification and assessment procedure, and the type of 
 39
 
In addition to these indicators, which try to measure the strength of competition regimes in an 
objective manner by relying on hard data on the competition policy characteristics of a country, 
there also exist other indicators which are based on subjective assessment of the effectiveness of 
these policies. The best example of these subjective indexes is the one published every year by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) in its Global Competitiveness Report. The WEF indicators score 
the competition policies of 80 countries on the basis of the results of a survey of top business 
executives, who are asked to rank their country’s antimonopoly policy between 1 (lax and not 
effective at promoting competition) and 6 (effective and promotes competition). The strong 
drawback of this type of indicators is that they are not easily comparable among each other, as they 
are built on subjective survey answers. Indeed, local businesspeople may not be familiar with 
competition regimes in other countries and may have difficulties performing a meaningful 
comparison. As a consequence the scores are likely to depend on people’s expectations with regard 
to their country. 
11 Conclusions 
This paper presents a newly-designed set of indicators for measuring the deterrence effect of a 
competition policy regime, the CPI. These indicators embody both formal and practical aspects of 
such a regime by combining key information on the legal framework, the institutional settings, and 
the enforcement tools. This information is evaluated against a benchmark of best practices and then 
aggregated. The weights used for the aggregation are based on our own evaluation of the 
importance of the various features of the competition policy, as well as on the completeness of the 
data we have managed to collect. We have assessed the sensitivity the CPIs by recalculating them 
using a set of weights generated by a purely statistical technique, the factor analysis. 
 
There is scope for further research and refinement of the CPIs. Firstly, the exercise could be 
repeated so as to cover a longer time period, as well as more countries. Secondly there remains 
room for expanding the database to include more detailed data on the enforcement features, in 
particular the indicators would benefit from the inclusion of more extensive information on the 
level of the sanctions that are effectively imposed on offending firms and on the extent to which 
offending firms are sued for damages. 
                                                                                                                                 
abuses of dominance and restrictive trade practices prohibited. 
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Appendix A 
Tables A.1 and A.2 summarise the scores given to each feature of a competition policy regime in 
building the low-level indexes (see section 4) and provides reference to the sources on which we 
have based our evaluation. For those variables that could be measured on a meaningful quantitative 
scale, e.g. those dealing with the amount of resources or with the powers of the CAs, our scoring 
approach was based on the simple assumption “the more, the better”.49 Hence, a jurisdiction obtains 
a higher score if the relevant CA is endowed with more investigative powers or resources. 
                                                 
49 This assumption reflects the view that the more powers and resources a CA has, the more accurate the decisions it 
makes so that errors are less likely. It is apparent that, if too much resources and powers are employed to reach a given 
level of deterrence, some issue on the efficiency of the CA may arise. However, in this paper we are only interested in 
measuring the effectiveness of competition policy, and not in its efficiency.  
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Table A.1: References for questions relative to antitrust features. 
ANTITRUST INFRINGEMENTS SCORES REFERENCES 
Independence 
Body that performs the investigation: 
Independent agency 1 
Investigation splits between an independent and a ministerial 
agency/department 
0.5 
Ministerial agency/department 0 
Voigt (2006), Section 3 
Oliveira. et al. (2009) 
OECD (2005a, 2005b) 
Body that takes the decision 
Independent agency/Court and Gov. cannot over-rule decisions  1 
Independent agency/Court and Gov. can over-rule decisions 0.5 
Ministerial agency/department 0 
Voigt (2007), p. 16 
Quality of the law 
Standard of proof for hard-core cartels and goals that inform the decision 
Per se prohibition 1 
Rule of reason and only economic goals 0.5 
Rule of reason and economic and other goals 0 
Voigt (2007), p. 10 - 14 
Motta (2004), p. 191 
OECD (2002b) 
Standard of proof for abuses and other agreements and goals pursued 
Per se prohibition 0 
Rule of reason and only economic goals 1 
Rule of reason and economic and other goals 0.5 
Voigt (2007), p. 10 -14 
Leniency program 
There is 1 
There is not 0 
OECD (2002a, 2002b) 
ICN, (2006) 
Motta (2004), p. 193 
Spagnolo (2000) 
Sanctions and damages 
Sanction to firms and criterion for maximum fine 
Illicit gain/ turnover 1 
Discretionary decision by adjudicator 0.66 
Maximum value 0.33 
No fine can be imposed 0 
OECD (2002a, 2002b) 
Separation of powers 
Nature of appeal court 
Specialised 1 
Non-specialised 0 
OECD (2007) 
Separation between prosecutor and adjudicator 
There is 1 
There is not 0 
Posner (1988) 
Wils (2004) 
Neven (2006) 
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Table A.2: References for questions relative to merger control features. 
MERGER CONTROL SCORES REFERENCES 
Independence 
The adjudicator is 
Independent in phase 1 and in phase 2 1 
Independent in phase 1 (or 2) but not independent in phase 2 (or 1) 0.5 
Not independent in phase 1 and in phase 2 0 
Oliveira et al. (2009) 
OECD (2005) 
Role of government in decision 
Government cannot over-rule decision regarding a merger 1 
Government can over-rule decision regarding a merger 0 
ICN (2006) 
Quality of the law  
Obligation to notify 
Threshold is based on turnover 1 
Threshold is based on market share 0.66 
There is no threshold 0.33 
There is no obligation to notify 0 
ICN (2006) 
Efficiency clause defence 
There is 1 
There is not 0 
Motta (2004), p. 238 
Williamson (1968) 
Farrell et al. (1990) 
ICN (2006) 
Separation of powers 
Nature of appeal court 
Specialized 1 
Not specialized 0 
OECD (2007) 
Separation between prosecutor and adjudicator 
There is 1 
There is not 0 
Posner (1988) 
Wils (2004) 
Neven (2006) 
Separation between bodies that decide in phase 1 and in phase 2 
There is 1 
There is not 0 
 
 43
References 
Aubert C., Kovacic W., Rey P., (2005), The Impact of Leniency and Whistleblowers Programs on 
Cartels. Forthcoming in the International Journal of Industrial Organization 
Becker G., (1968), Crime and Punishment an economic approach, Journal of Political Economy, 
76(2): 169-217. 
Block, M., J. Parker, O. Vyborna and L. Dusek (2000), An experimental comparison of adversarial 
versus inquisitorial procedural regimes, American Law and Economics Review, 2(1), 170–94. 
Boylaud O. G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta (2000), Summary Indicators of Product Market Regulation 
with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers , No. 226, OECD Publishing;  
Buccirossi et. al (2009a), Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment, 
Mimeo 
Buccirossi et. al (2009b), Deterrence in Competition Law, Mimeo 
Buccirossi, P. (2007), "Introduction", in Buccirossi P. (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 
Boston: MIT Press.  
Buccirossi P., and G. Spagnolo, (2007), Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price 
Fixers Still Go To Prison?, in V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.), The Political Economy of Antitrust, 
Elsevier, North Holland. 
Buccirossi P, G. Spagnolo, and C. Vitale, (2006), The Cost of Inappropriate Interventions/non 
Interventions under Article 82, OFT 864. 
Conway, P. V. Janod and G. Nicoletti (2005), Product Market Regulation in OECD Countries: 1998 
to 2003, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 568, OECD Publishing;  
Conway, P. and G. Nicoletti (2006), Product Market Regulation in the Non-Manufacturing Sectors 
of OECD Countries: Measurement and Highlights, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No. 530, OECD Publishing.  
Connor J.M., (2005), Optimal Deterrence and Private Antitrust Enforcement, Manuscript, Purdue 
University;  
Craycraft C. et al (1997) Antitrust Sanctions and Firm Ability to Pay, Review of Industrial 
Organization, 12, 171-183;  
 44
Craycraft J.L., Gallo J.C., Dau Schmidt K.G. and Parker C. J., (1994) Criminal Penalties Under the 
Sherman Act: A Study of Law and Economics, Research in Law and Economics, 16, 25-71;  
Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1999), Advocates, Journal of Political Economy, 107(1), 1–39. 
Genoud C. (2003), Toward a content and contextual approach of delegation, or “how and why we 
should open the regulation black box”, Paper prepared for the workshop "Delegation in 
Contemporary Democracies", ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh 2003 
Geradin D. and Henry, D., (2005), The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An 
empirical Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts' Judgments. 
Forthcoming in Cseres K.J., Schinkel M.P. and Vogelaar F.O.W. (Eds.), “Remedies and Sanctions 
in Competition Policy: Economic and Legal Implications of the Tendency to Criminalize Antitrust 
Enforcement in the EU Member States”, Edwar Elgar, London;  
Gilardi F. (2002), Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a 
comparative empirical, Journal of European Public Policy, 9 (6), 873-893 
Gilardi F. (2003), Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe: a Cross-
Sectional Comparison, Paper prepared for the workshop "Delegation in Contemporary 
Democracies", ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh 2003 
Harrington J., (2008), Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs, Journal of Industrial Economics, 56 
(2), 215 - 246 
Hylton K. and Deng F., (2006), Antitrust around the World: An empirical analysis of the scope of 
competition law and their effects, Boston University School of Law Working Paper Law and 
Economics, N. 06-47 
Høj, J. (2007), Competition Law and Policy Indicators for the OECD countries, OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No. 568, OECD Publishing. 
ICN, (2006), Recommended Practices For Merger Notification Procedures and Reviews (available 
at www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mnprecpractices.pdf). 
Kaplow L. and S. Shavell, (2002), Fairness versus Efficiency, Harvard University Press. 
Keynes J.M., (1921), A Treatise on Probability, MacMillan. 
Kobayashi B., (2002), Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal 
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, George Mason University School of Law, 
Working Paper No. 02-04. 
 45
Landes W.M., (1983), Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, The University of Chicago Law 
Review, 50,652-678. 
Levitt S. D., (2001), Deterrence, in Wilson J. Q. and Petersilia J. (Eds.), Crime, ICS press 
Levitt S. D., (1998), Juvenile Crime and Punishment,  Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6), 1156-
1185 
Levitt S. D. and Miles T.J., (2006), Economic Contributions to the Understanding of Crime, Annual 
Review of Law and Social Sciences, 2, 147–64 
Majone, D. (1996), Regulating Europe, Routledge, 
Motta, M., Polo, M., (2003), Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 21, 347-379. 
Motta M. (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press. 
Neven, D. J., (2006), Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe, Economic Policy, October, 
741–791. 
Neven D. J. and L. H. Röller, (2005), Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political 
Economy Model of Merger Control, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23, Issues 9-
10, 829-848. 
Nicoletti G., and S. Scarpetta, (2005), Product Market Reforms and Employment in OECD 
Countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 472. 
OECD, (2002a), Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes 
OECD, (2002b), Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against 
Cartels Under National Competition Laws. 
OECD (2003), Optimal Design of a Competition Agency. Note by the Secretariat 
(CCNM/GF/COMP(2003)2) 
OECD (2005a), Designing Independent and Accountable Regulatory Authorities for High Quality 
Regulation. 
OECD (2005b), European Commission - Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy. 
OECD (2007), Private Remedies 
Oliveira G., Machado E. L. and Novaes L.M., (2009), Aspects of the Independence of Regulatory 
Agencies and Competition Advocacy, in Mehta S. P. and S. J. Evenett (Eds.), “Politics Triumphs 
Economics? Political Economy and the Implementation of Competition Law and Economic 
 46
Regulation in Developing Countries”, Academic Foundation. 
Polinsky A. M. and S. Shavell , (2000), The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 
Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159. 
Posner, R., (1988), “Comment: Responding to Gordon Tullock”, Research in Law and Policy 
Studies, 2, 29. 
Salop S., (2005), What is the real and proper antitrust welfare standard? Answer: The true consumer 
welfare standard, Statement before the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
Schinkel, M.P. and J. Tuinstra, (2006), Imperfect competition law enforcement, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 24(6), 1267-1297. 
Schinkel, M.P. (2007). Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe, World Competition, 30 , (4), 539-
572. 
Simon, M.J and G.J.Werden, (1987), Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison, Antitrust Bulletin, 32, 
917-937 
Spagnolo G., (2000), Optimal Leniency Programs, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Note di Lavoro, 
42/2000. 
Spagnolo G., (2004), Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programs, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
4840. http://www.ssrn.com 
Spagnolo G., (2008) Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust, in Buccirossi P. (Ed.), “Handbook 
of Antitrust Economics”, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Stigler G., (1966), The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, Journal of Law and Economics 9: 
225-258. 
Voigt S., (2007), The Economic Effects of Competition Policy – Cross-Country Evidence Using 
Four New Indicators, mimeo. 
Wils, W., (2004), “The combination of the investigative and prosecutorial function and the 
adjudicative function in EC antitrust enforcement: a legal and economic analysis”, World 
Competition, 27(2), 201–24.  
Bücher des Schwerpunkts Märkte und Politik  
Books of the Research Area Markets and Politics 
 
 
Kai A. Konrad, Tim Lohse (Eds.) 
Einnahmen- und Steuerpolitik in Europa: 
Herausforderungen und Chancen  
2009, Peter Lang Verlag 
Kai A. Konrad  
Strategy and Dynamics in Contests 
2009, Oxford University Press 
Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai A. Konrad 
(Eds.)  
40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 
2008, Springer 
Kai A. Konrad, Beate Jochimsen (Eds.) 
Föderalismuskommission II:  
Neuordnung von Autonomie und Verantwortung 
2008, Peter Lang Verlag 
Mark Gradstein, Kai A. Konrad (Eds.) 
Institutions and Norms in Economic Development 
2007, MIT Press 
Johannes Münster 
Mobbers, Robbers, and Warriors 
2007, Shaker Verlag 
Kai A. Konrad, Beate Jochimsen (Eds.) 
Der Föderalstaat nach dem Berlin-Urteil 
2007, Peter Lang Verlag 
Kai A. Konrad, Beate Jochimsen (Eds.) 
Finanzkrise im Bundesstaat 
2006, Peter Lang Verlag 
Robert Nuscheler 
On Competition and Regulation in Health Care 
Systems 
2005, Peter Lang Verlag 
Pablo Beramendi 
Decentralization and Income Inequality 
2003, Madrid: Juan March Institute 
Thomas R. Cusack 
A National Challenge at the Local Level: Citizens, 
Elites and Institutions in Reunified Germany 
2003, Ashgate 
Sebastian Kessing 
Essays on Employment Protection 
2003, Freie Universität Berlin  
http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2003/202 
Daniel Krähmer 
On Learning and Information in Markets and 
Organizations 
2003, Shaker Verlag 
Tomaso Duso 
The Political Economy of the Regulatory Process: 
An Empirical Approach 
Humboldt-University Dissertation, 2002, Berlin, 
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/duso-tomaso-
2002-07-17/PDF/Duso.pdf 
Bob Hancké 
Large Firms and Institutional Change. Industrial 
Renewal and Economic Restructuring in France 
2002, Oxford University Press 
Andreas Stephan 
Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastruc-
ture to Private:  Production and its Political 
Economy 
2002, dissertation.de 
Peter A. Hall, David Soskice (Eds.) 
Varieties of Capitalism 
2001, Oxford University Press 
Hans Mewis 
Essays on Herd Behavior and Strategic Delegation 
2001, Shaker Verlag 
Andreas Moerke 
Organisationslernen über Netzwerke – Die 
personellen Verflechtungen von Führungsgremien 
japanischer Aktiengesellschaften 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Silke Neubauer 
Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Christian Wey (Eds.) 
Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der neuen 
Weltwirtschaft, WZB Jahrbuch 2001 
2001, edition sigma 
Michael Tröge 
Competition in Credit Markets: A Theoretic 
Analysis 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, David Soskice 
(Eds.) 
Unions, Employers, and Central Banks 
2000, Cambridge University Press 
Tobias Miarka 
Financial Intermediation and Deregulation:  
A Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-
Relationships 
2000, Physica-Verlag 
Rita Zobel 
Beschäftigungsveränderungen und 
organisationales Lernen in japanischen 
Industriengesellschaften 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/zobel-rita-
2000-06-19  
Jos Jansen 
Essays on Incentives in Regulation and Innovation 
2000, Tilburg University 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2008 
 
Dan Kovenock 
Brian Roberson 
Inefficient Redistribution and Inefficient 
Redistributive Politics 
SP II 2008 – 01 
Dan Kovenock 
Brian Roberson 
Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with Application 
to the Economics of Alliances 
SP II 2008 – 02 
Vito Tanzi The Future of Fiscal Federalism SP II 2008 – 03 
 
Kai A. Konrad 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Love and Taxes – and Matching Institutions SP II 2008 – 04 
Benny Geys 
Jan Vermeir 
Party Cues and Yardstick Voting SP II 2008 – 05 
Benny Geys 
Jan Vermeir 
The Political Cost of Taxation:  
New Evidence from German Popularity Ratings 
SP II 2008 – 06 
Kai A. Konrad 
Dan Kovenock 
The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity 
Constraints 
SP II 2008 – 07 
Johannes Münster Repeated Contests with Asymmetric Information SP II 2008 – 08 
Kai A. Konrad 
Dan Kovenock 
Competition for FDI with Vintage Investment and 
Agglomeration Advantages 
SP II 2008 – 09 
Kai A. Konrad Non-binding Minimum Taxes May Foster Tax 
Competition 
SP II 2008 – 10 
Florian Morath Strategic Information Acquisition and the Mitigation 
of Global Warming 
SP II 2008 – 11 
 
Joseph Clougherty 
Anming Zhang 
Domestic Rivalry and Export Performance: Theory 
and Evidence from International Airline Markets 
SP II 2008 – 12 
Jonathan Beck Diderot’s Rule SP II 2008 – 13 
Susanne Prantl The Role of Policies Supporting New Firms:  
An Evaluation for Germany after Reunification 
SP II 2008 – 14 
  
Jo Seldeslachts 
Tomaso Duso 
Enrico Pennings 
On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: 
Implications for Collusion 
SP II 2008 – 15 
 
Dan Kovenock 
Brian Roberson 
Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal? SP II 2008 – 16 
 
Joseph Clougherty 
Tomaso Duso 
The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals:  
Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger 
SP II 2008 – 17  
Benny Geys 
Wim Moesen 
Exploring Sources of Local Government Technical 
Inefficiency: Evidence from Flemish Municipalities 
SP II 2008 – 18 
Benny Geys 
Friedrich Heinemann 
 Alexander Kalb 
Local Governments in the Wake of Demographic 
Change: Evidence from German Municipalities 
SP II 2008 – 19 
Johannes Münster Group Contest Success Functions SP II 2008 – 20 
Benny Geys 
Wim Moesen 
Measuring Local Government Technical 
(In)efficiency: An Application and Comparison of 
FDH, DEA and Econometric Approaches 
SP II 2008 – 21 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2009 
 
Áron Kiss Coalition Politics and Accountability SP II 2009 – 01 
Benny Geys 
Friedrich Heinemann 
Alexander Kalb 
Voter Involvement, Fiscal Autonomy and Public 
Sector Efficiency: Evidence from German 
Municipalities 
SP II 2009 – 02 
Salmai Qari 
Kai A. Konrad 
Benny Geys 
Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility SP II 2009 – 03 
Kai A. Konrad 
Salmai Qari 
The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? Patriotism and 
Tax Compliance 
SP II 2009 – 04 
Sven Chojnacki 
Nils Metternich 
Johannes Münster 
Mercenaries in Civil Wars, 1950-2000 SP II 2009 – 05 
Oliver Gürtler 
Johannes Münster 
Sabotage in Dynamic Tournaments SP II 2009 – 06 
Dan Kovenock 
Brian Roberson 
Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-the-Vote’ Efforts and Policy 
Outcomes 
SP II 2009 – 07 
Subhasish M. 
Chowdhury 
Dan Kovenock 
Roman M. Sheremeta 
An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto 
Games 
SP II 2009 – 08 
Michael R. Baye 
Dan Kovenock 
Casper G. de Vries 
Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers SP II 2009 – 09 
Florian Morath 
Johannes Münster 
Information Acquisition in Conflicts SP II 2009 – 10 
Benny Geys Wars, Presidents and Popularity: 
The Political Cost(s) of War Re-examined 
SP II 2009 – 11 
Paolo Buccirossi 
Lorenzo Ciari 
Tomaso Duso 
Giancarlo Spagnolo 
Cristiana Vitale 
Competition policy and productivity growth:  
An empirical assessment 
SP II 2009 – 12 
Pedro P. Barros 
Joseph Clougherty 
Jo Seldeslachts 
 
How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger 
Policy: Frequency or Composition? 
SP II 2009 – 13 
Paolo Buccirossi 
Lorenzo Ciari 
Tomaso Duso 
Giancarlo Spagnolo 
Cristiana Vitale 
Deterrence in Competition Law SP II 2009 – 14 
Paolo Buccirossi 
Lorenzo Ciari 
Tomaso Duso 
Giancarlo Spagnolo 
Cristiana Vitale 
Measuring the deterrence properties of competition 
policy: the Competition Policy Indexes 
SP II 2009 – 15 
Bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers schicken 
Sie bitte unbedingt einen an Sie adressierten Auf-
kleber mit sowie je paper eine Briefmarke im Wert 
von 0,51 Euro oder einen "Coupon Reponse Inter-
national " (für Besteller aus dem Ausland) 
 Please send a self addressed label and postage 
stamps in the amount of 0.51 Euro or a "Coupon- 
Reponse International" (if you are ordering from 
outside Germany) for each WZB-paper requested 
 
Bestellschein Order Form 
 
 
 
 
Absender / Return Address: 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung 
Presse- und Informationsreferat 
Reichpietschufer 50 
 
D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten  
 
 
 
Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s) 
Discussion paper(s): 
 
 
 
Please send me the following 
Discussion paper(s): 
Bestell-Nr. / Order no. Autor/in, Kurztitel /Author(s) / Title(s) in brief 
  
 
